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Abstract
Cryptocurrency refers to a type of digital asset that uses distributed ledger, or
blockchain, technology to enable a secure transaction. Although the technology is
widely misunderstood, many central banks are considering launching their own na-
tional cryptocurrency. In contrast to most data in financial economics, detailed data
on the history of every transaction in the cryptocurrency complex are freely avail-
able. Furthermore, empirically-oriented research is only now beginning, presenting
an extraordinary research opportunity for academia. We provide some insights into
the mechanics of cryptocurrencies, describing summary statistics and focusing on
potential future research avenues in financial economics.
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1 Introduction
In 2008, the pseudonymous “Satoshi Nakamoto” posted a white paper describing an im-
plementation of a digital currency called bitcoin that used blockchain technology. More
than ten years later, hundreds of cryptocurrencies and innumerable other applications of
blockchain technology are readily available.
The rise of cryptocurrencies poses an existential threat to many traditional functions
in finance. Cryptocurrencies embrace a peer-to-peer mechanism and effectively eliminate
the “middle man”, which could be a financial institution. For example, no bank account
or credit card is needed to transact in the world of cryptocurrencies. Indeed, a crypto-
currency “wallet” serves the same function as a bank vault. With a smart phone and the
internet, the potential exists for a revolution in financial inclusion — given that over two
billion people are unbanked (GlobalFindex, 2017; World Bank, 2017).
The technology, however, goes well beyond providing banking services to the un-
banked. It holds the potential for cheap, secure, and near-instant transactions, allowing
billions of people to join the world of internet commerce, paying, and being paid, for
goods or services, outside of the traditional banking and credit card infrastructure.
Cryptocurrencies transactions potentially enable near real-time micropayments. Credit
cards are not designed to be used for a one-cent charge to download, for example, a
product or service from the internet. Cryptocurrency systems promise to make micropay-
ments seamless and allow businesses to offer real-time pay-per-use consumption of their
products, such as video, audio, cell phone service, utilities, and so forth.
A cryptocurrency like bitcoin can be thought of as a decentralized autonomous organi-
zation (DAO), an open-source peer-to-peer digital network that enforces the rules it is set
up with. In this DAO setting, the money supply is set by an algorithmic rule, and the in-
tegrity of the network replaces the need to trust the integrity of human participants. The
growth of crypotcurrency technology therefore poses a challenge to traditional monetary
authorities and central banks, as Facebook’s “Libra” coin pre-emission market accept-
ance suggests (Taskinsoy, 2019). Central banks understand this, and many banks have
initiated their own national cryptocurrency initiatives (Bech and Garratt, 2017).
As with any new technology, risks are present. In the nascent cryptocurrency mar-
ket, one concern involves the anonymous nature of transactions in some cryptocurrencies,
which could allow nefarious actors to conduct illegal business, or worse, to pose a broader
threat to our society and institutions (Foley et al., 2018). The benefits, such as low
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transaction cost, security and the promise of quick processing, are readily measurable,
but quantifying the risks is less straightforward.
In our view, any new technology involves risks; if we require no risk, innovation is con-
strained (Catalini and Gans, 2016). Cryptocurrencies have, in contrast to many markets,
a plethora of available and free data, ripe for empirical investigation. We are just now
seeing the genesis of academic research focusing on this emerging technology (Harvey,
2014, 2017a, 2017b; Ha¨rdle et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2019).
We have four goals in this paper. First, we explain the mechanics of cryptocurrencies
at a high level. Second, we detail useful data sources for researchers. Third, we provide
basic summary statistics given the available data. Finally, we offer a list of possible
research applications.
2 Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains
The concept of supplementary (Delmolino et al., 2016), alternative (Ametrano, 2016), or
digital currencies (Chaum, 1983) is not new, but the concept of an open-source currency
without a central point of trust, such as a central distribution agency or state lead control,
is new (King and Nadal, 2012). A cryptocurrency is a digital asset designed to work as a
medium of exchange using cryptography to secure transactions, to control the creation of
additional value units, and to verify the transfer of assets. Many different cryptocurrencies
exist, each with their own set of rules, see, for example, coinmarketcap.com (Iwamura
et al., 2014; Abraham et al., 2016; Bartos, 2015; Park et al., 2015). Differences among
the cryptocurrencies may involve, for example, the choice of the consensus mechanism,
the latency, or the cryptographic hashing algorithms.
2.1 High-level description of blockchain
Abadi and Brunnermeier (2018) describe a blockchain trilemma, i.e. that no ledger can
satisfy all ideal qualities of any recordkeeping system — correctness, decentralization,
and cost efficiency — simultaneously. Yet, a blockchain is more efficient than a centrally
managed traditional ledger (Babich and Hilary, 2018a). A blockchain can be implemented
in many ways, but most share several common features. We can think of a blockchain as
a very special database. A blockchain’s structure is shared, or distributed, rather than
centralized, and thus is often referred to as distributed ledger technology (DLT). Figure 1
shows a distributed network. As we discuss later, the distributed network provides some
level of security, because it is unlikely an attack can be launched on every copy of the
database. Distributed databases are not new, and most distributed databases are not
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blockchains. The key difference between a regular distributed database and one set on a
blockchain is the structure (Babich and Hillary, 2018b).
A blockchain is divided into subsheets of data, each one called a block. At the end of
each block is a digest that summarizes the contents of the block. The digest is repeated
as the first line of the next block. If any change is made in the content of a historical
block, the digest changes for that block and it will not match the first line of the next
block. When the network detects such an inconsistency, it throws out the corrupted
block and replaces the block with the original. In this sense, the database is immutable.
Given this structure (i.e., data organized in blocks with updates to the blockchain being
append-only, based on the respective consensus mechanism), it is extremely unlikely that
history can be rewritten. The digest at the end of a block and at the beginning of the
next is generated by a cryptographic hashing function.
(a) Centralized (b) Decentralized (c) Distributed
Figure 1: Types of networks. (github.com/QuantLet/CrixToDate)
All presented numerical and pictoral examples shown are reproducible and can be
found on www.quantlet.de (Borke and Ha¨rdle, 2018).
2.2 Hashing
A hash function is a one-way mathematical algorithm that takes an input and transforms
it into an output, known as the hash or digest. Hashing functions have a long history in
computer science and are integral to the blockchain technology. Hashing should not be
confused with encryption. With encryption, a file is encrypted with a key and decrypted
with a key. Hashing has no decryption step. Additionally, a good hashing algorithm
makes it computationally infeasible to find two input values that produce the same hash
value (output); this is known as collision resistance (Paar and Pelzl, 2010; Derose, 2015;
Harvey, 2016).
One common cryptographic hashing algorithm, the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-
256), has a maximum input size of 264-1 bits (more than 2 million terabytes) and an
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output of 256 bits. We usually represent the SHA-256 output in hexadecimal form, also
called base 16 (the characters 0-9 and a-f). In order to make the theoretical maximal
input size more visual, we assume that 1 bit equals to 1 mm2. A soccer field has the
dimensions of 7,140 m2, therefore 264-1 bits could theoretically fill 2,583,577,601 soccer
fields. As the whole surface of the earth equals to 510,000,000,000,000 m2, we could also
cover around 36170 times the earth with the theoretical input size. This input informa-
tion will be stored in a very short output, the hash. If just one piece of the input, like
for example a blank space or a comma, is changed, then the hash output be completely
different.
Importantly, the digest does not reveal the original information. For example, suppose
we want to send an electronic document via email, but are worried that the document
could be corrupted and the content altered. One way to verify the integrity of the email
is to use a hashing function, such as the SHA-256. Before sending the email, we obtain
a SHA-256 of the document and post the SHA-256 on our website. We then send the
document. The recipient also hashes the document to verify the hash is the same as the
hash on our website. If they are identical, we have securely sent the document. Posting
the hash on our website does not reveal the content of the email.
Here are some examples, which you can try by using the R package “digest” (cran.r-pro
ject.org/web/packages/digest), the Python libary “hashlib” (docs.python.org/2/library/
hashlib.html), or many online programs such as interactive Github-based repositories
(emn178.github.io/online-tools/sha256.htm).
Input: Hello CRIX
Output: f9a2b57d86cc4ba463a3bedbbe0c7e850da5b34c6bcc1a92b794308ceaf93761
Input: Hallo CRIX
Output: 0198c2ea3632efd2758cd40a5609037fe4aa1590850339ad6d6a7fd3e518ec65
Note that changing a single letter from “e” to “a” completely changes the hash.
2.3 Blockchains
Haber and Stornetta (1991) were the first to propose a linear hash chain or blockchain.
They solved the problem of how to certify when a digital document was created or last
changed by timestamping a cryptographic hash of the document. By not timestamping
the data itself, the privacy of the content was preserved. Haber and Stornetta’s time-
stamping proposal also solved the potential problems of collusion and lack of trust by
linking hash values together and using digital signatures, which uniquely identify the
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signer.
A year later, Dwork and Naor (1992) proposed a proof-of-work system to combat junk
email. Their idea was to provide each email with a header containing virtual postage in
the form of a single calculation, which the receiver could verify with very little effort.
This postage stamp was to be proof that a modest amount of CPU time was expended
for calculating the stamp prior to sending the email. Whereas an individual email could
be sent at a very low cost, the intent was to defeat spammers, who send millions of
emails. Spamming would come at a high price. Back (2002) coined the term hashcash
to describe this proof of work, the computational cost of producing each hash, a term
first used by Jakobsson and Juels (1999).
Many applications of blockchain technology exist, but we focus our attention on
cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin (cryptocurrency known as BTC; bitcoin.org) was the first ex-
ample of a digital asset, which has no backing or intrinsic value, based on blockchain
technology (Nakamoto, 2008; Bo¨hme et al., 2015, for a review).
A common characteristic of cryptocurrencies is a network of peers with equal stand-
ing. Each participant has a copy of the ledger and offers an algorithmic consent on the
correct ledger (i.e., which new block is accepted and which block is rejected to form a
new part of the blockchain). It is unneccesary to know your peers in a blockchain or
to trust them. It is also possible to design a blockchain so that only specific trusted
parties have the ability to add to the ledger. Private, permissioned blockchains are a
source of considerable interest for many central banks (MAS, 2017; Bundesbank, 2017;
SARB, 2018). In contrast to cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, trust is necessary in the
permissioned blockchain, because the central banks actually “own” the coins, i.e. as a
governing layer they have the right to change the supply of coins (Bordo and Levin, 2017).
Any type of transaction, for example, a financial contract for any type of property
transfer, can be put into a blockchain. Given its immutability, a blockchain provides an
official record of the contract and a single agreed-upon version of the contract, which is
unlikely to be disputed.
To summarize, a blockchain is distinguished from an ordinary distributed database
by its unique structure, which linearly connects smaller pieces of the database, or the
blocks. The chaining comes in the form of a cryptographic hashing function. Any change
to history will break the chain on a particular copy of the database. When a chain is
broken, the network fixes it by replacing any corrupted block with a valid block.
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2.4 Cryptocurrencies
A currency without an intrinsic value, such as a cryptocurrency like bitcoin, can only func-
tion if sufficient market acceptance is present and if the belief exists that the currency
has the value attributed to it. With a conventional fiat system, money has value because
people trust the central bank. For a cryptocurrency, additions to the public ledger are
confirmed by a crowd of participants. There is no central bank and participants do not
need to trust each other — trust only applies to the algorithm and the network that
defines the particular blockchain. A transaction is only valid if the output is equal to the
input, that is, the transactor actually has the funds she or he wants to transfer. The only
exceptions are new issues of the cryptocurrency, which are algorithmicly predetermined.
We have demonstrated the simplicity of creating a SHA-256 hash to link one block to
the next. Why is it then that massive computing power is needed to maintain the bitcoin
network? The power required has to do with the proof-of-work consensus concept. The
danger of using a simple SHA-256 is that a nefarious actor could change a historical block
and all subsequent blocks, essentially rewriting history, by ensuring all hashes match. To
make this unlikely, Nakamoto (2008) proposed the idea of requiring “work”. Thus, in-
stead of simply providing any SHA-256 output, a special SHA-256 output, which has
many leading zeros, is required. In other words, the proposed SHA-256 hash needs to be
lower than or equal to the current target in order for the block to be accepted by the
network as the next block to be added to the blockchain. This “difficulty” ensures that a
new block is added on average every 10 minutes (bitinfocharts.com/comparison/bitcoin-
confirmationtime.html)to the bitcoin blockchain (so-called block time). To find this spe-
cial hash, certain nodes, called miners, will take a candidate group of verified transactions
and cycle through numbers, say, 1, 2, 3, . . . [very large number], until the output of the
SHA-256 has some leading zeros. This number, which is added to a digest of the trans-
actions, is called a nonce.
The computing power requirement arises because the leading zeros are determined
via a brute-force search. The probability of one leading zero is 1/16, but the probability
of, for example, 18 leading zeros is a very small number, (1/16)18. The search is why the
vast computing power is needed, see subsection 2.2.
The first miner that finds the (currently) 18 leading zeros, as in our example, presents
its group of transactions and the nonce to the network. Verifying that the transactions
plus nonce delivers the leading zeros is easy. Once each node verifies the candidate block,
the new block is added to the bitcoin blockchain. This process is the bitcoin consensus
mechanism. The miner that found the winning block is rewarded with freshly “minted”
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bitcoin. If technology advances or additional computing joins the mining efforts in the
network so that blocks are being solved in less than 10 mintues, the algorithm adjusts
the difficulty to, perhaps, 19 leading zeros. If computing power leaves the network, the
difficulty can be reduced.
Cryptocurrency mining is therefore analogous to gold mining. Gold mining is ex-
pensive. Cryptocurrency miners spend computing power to find the hash as described
above. A gold miner only gets rewarded if gold is found. Cryptocurrency miners only get
rewarded if they are the first to find the winning hash. Like mining for gold, mining for
cryptocurrency is risky. The continuous expenditure of resources such as for hardware
and energy (see also subsection 4.9) for a prolonged period without being rewarded is an
inherent risk.
Proof of work makes it unlikely that a historical block and all subsequent blocks can
be altered, but securing the highly specialized computing power needed to rewrite history
is not currently likely. Nakamoto (2008) states that if a single entity gains 51% of the
computing power, it is possible.
Proof of work is only one approach to consensus, many alternative mechanisms ex-
ist and they may not entail the high equipment and energy costs that bitcoin miners
face. The second leading cryptocurrency, Ethereum (ethereum.org), uses a similar proof-
of-work mechanism. Ethereum, however, has committed to change to a proof-of-stake
mechanism (Franco, 2015; ETH, 2018). Instead of allocating block mining proportionally
to the relative hashing power, the proof-of-stake protocol allocates blocks proportionally
to the current holdings (Buterin, 2014; Cotillard, 2015). As a result, the participants
with the most cryptocurrency are particularly incented to do the right thing to keep
the system running and healthy. Such a method holds the promise of much-improved
latency and substantially less energy consumption. A participant who possesses 1% of
the cryptocurrency could mine 1%, on average, of the proof-of-stake blocks. Ethereum
has a number of other differences from bitcoin. Ethereum blocks are added approxim-
ately every 14 seconds (etherscan.io/chart/blocktime) rather than every 10 minutes, and
importantly, ethereum allows for smart contracts, or small computer programs, to be
deployed in its blockchain. These smart contracts are run redundantly on each node.
Many other consensus mechanisms are currently available: STEEM’s proof of brain
rewards participants for creating and curating content in their social network (STEEM.io
Bluepaper; steem.io/steem-bluepaper.pdf) and Slimcoin’s proof of burn bootstraps one
cryptocurrency off another by demonstrating proof of having “burnt” some units of value
by sending a specific amount to a verifiable unspendable address (Slimcoin Whitepaper;
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github.com/slimcoin-project/slimcoin-project.github.io/raw/master/whitepaperSLM.pdf),
or different implementations of the Byzantine fault tolerance, which was first described as
the Byzantine Generals’ Problem by Lamport et al. (1982), are used by systems such as
NEO (neo.org), Stellar (stellar.org) and Hyperledger Fabric (hyperledger-fabric.readthedo
cs.io).
2.5 Not all cryptocurrencies are the same
We can group cryptocurrencies into seven broad classes. Bitcoin falls into the first cat-
egory; it was originally designed as a transaction mechanism. Think of it as Gold 2.0.
Litecoin (litecoin.org) is very similar to bitcoin and was one of the first alternatives to
bitcoin. Litecoin’s blocks are added every 2.5 minutes (bitinfocharts.com/comparison/lite
coin-confirmationtime.html), on average, compared to every 10 minutes for bitcoin.
Ethereum falls into the second class: a distributed computation token. As mentioned
earlier, it is possible to run a computer program on the ethereum network. Think of
it as an Internet computer where small programs, smart contracts, are executed when
called upon, on every node. Other examples in this class include Tezos (tezos.com), EOS
(eos.io) and DFinity (dfinity.org).
The third class of cryptocurrency is called a utility token. A utility token is a pro-
grammable blockchain asset. One example is Golem (golem.network), a currency that
allows the user to buy computing power from a network of users or to sell excess capacity
to others. Storj (storj.io)is similar and allows the user to rent out unused disk storage.
Other examples in this class are Sia (sia.tech) and FileCoin (filecoin.io).
The fourth class of cryptocurrency is a security token, a token that represents stocks,
bonds, derivatives, or other financial assets. New security token offerings are called STOs.
This type of token could lead to substantial efficiency gains in both clearing and settle-
ment.
The fifth class is called fungible tokens. The most popular is called ERC-20 which is
issued on the ethereum blockchain. Here a small amount of ETH represents something
different – and more valuable.
A non-fungible token is the sixth classification. In this case, each token is unique
and not interchangeable with another. One popular protocol is ethereum’s ERC-721.
Dhrama debt agreements fall into this classification. Two other eamples of non-fungible
tokens are Cryptokitties (cryptokitties.co) and Decentraland (LAND; decentraland.org).
10
The final class of cryptocurrencies are called stablecoins. There are four categories.
The first category is collateralized with fiat currency. This includes stablecoins such as
tether (USDT)(tether.to) and Circle’s USDC (circle.com). These cryptocurrencies are
designed to be fully collaterized by US dollar deposits. LBXPeg (lbx.com/blog/lbx-peg)
is tied to pound sterling. An emerging market, Mongolia has a cryptocurrency called
Candy (candy.mn) tied to their currency. This class also includes national cryptofiats.
As mentioned earlier, many central bank are investigating the potential Fedcoin (US
Federal Reserve), Eurocoin (European Central Bank), CADCoin (Bank of Canada), for
example. Venezuela already issued a national crypto called Petro (petro.gob.ve).
The second category of stablecoins are collateralized with real assets. Examples in-
clude currencies that are collateralized by gold (Digix Gold, DGX; digix.global), a basket
of seven precious metals used in technology (Tiberius coin, TCX; tiberiuscoin.com) or
even Swiss real estate (Swiss Real Coin, SRC; swissrealcoin.io).
The third category of stablecoins are cryptocurrency collateralized. The leading ex-
ample is the collateralized debt positions that MakerDAO offers that enable their DAI
coin (makerdao.com/en/dai) to be pegged to the US dollar.
The final category of stablecoins are uncollateralized. An example of this type of
inititive is the Basis project (basis.io) and their basecoin which has been put on hold
given regulatory concerns.
This list of classifications is not exhaustive because many cryptocurrency concepts,
such as Overlay (overlay.market) or Facebook’s Libra (libra.org), do not easily fit within
our seven-category taxonomy. Our point is simple: cryptocurrencies have many uses
and characteristics that extend beyond the traditional cryptocurrencies of bitcoin and
ethereum.
3 Summary Analysis of Cryptocurrencies
We will now focus on an econometric analysis of the currently most liquid cryptocur-
rencies. Valuation of currencies that are not collateralized or linked to real assets is a
challenge. These currencies are highly volatile and subject to bubble-like behavior. These
currencies, however, provide an ideal testing ground for economic theory. In the fall of
2017, bitcoin rose to over $19,000. The bubble burst in 2018. Because every bitcoin
transaction is freely available, we are provided with an extraordinary research opportun-
ity. We begin with a simple benchmarking analysis using the S&P 500 Index (S&P 500),
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SPDR Gold Shares (GOLD), and CBOE Volatility Index (VIX; cboe.com/vix), which
measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index.
3.1 Cryptocurrency data sources
Many, sometimes very generic, data sources are available for cryptocurrencies, which un-
like traditional assets trade 24/7, creating a vast amount of data to capture. Blockchain-
based systems — most of which are open to the public for participation — have data
that are readily available using basic API’s (application programming interface).1 In
subsection 4.3, we discuss exchange APIs, which provide the data for actual crypto-
currency market transactions (Guo and Li, 2017). Several of the more important data
sources include CoinGecko (coingecko.com), a cryptocurrency ranking and evaluation
site that breaks down quantitative and qualitative data for a number of different met-
rics, as well as Coinmarketcap (coinmarketcap.com), Onchainfx (onchainfx.com), Crypto-
compare (crypt ocompare.com), BitInfoCharts (bitinfocharts.com), CoinCheckup (co-
incheckup.com), and Coincodex (coincodex.com). Each has unique attributes.
3.2 Statistical overview of cryptocurrencies
While there are thousands of cryptocurrencies, we focus our analysis on three: bitcoin
(BTC), ethereum (ETH), and Ripple (XRP; ripple.com). To represent traditional assets,
we have chosen S&P 500, GOLD, and VIX. Each cryptocurrency has a different imple-
mentation. Some, like Litecoin, are very similar to BTC. As previously mentioned, ETH
allows for distributed computation. In contrast to BTC, ETH may be easier to value
because it has a tangible component (i.e., running a computer program on a network).
XRP focuses on the banking sector with the promise of fast and secure transfers of
tokens, whether in fiat, cryptocurrency, commodity, or other unit of value, across different
networks, geographic borders, and currencies (Aranda and Zagone, 2015). The Ripple
system’s efficiency and security challenges the traditional SWIFT system for transfers,
which is now also interested in blockchain-based technologies (Arnold, 2018).
In Figure 2, we show the cumulative return over time for BTC, XRP, ETH, SPDR
GOLD Shares and S&P 500 from May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30, 2019. We chose this short
time period because, prior to this, the cryptocurrency market was substantially illiquid;
it was not until 2016 that the initial influx of exchanges and users entered the market.
By May 2017, all three cryptocurrencies were active and had achieved sufficiently high
1For this brief analysis, we are using cryptocurrency data provided by the CRIX database (thecrix.de)
and the Cryptocompare API (cryptocompare.com/api), as well as data for the traditional assets provided
through the Bloomberg Terminal. Further information can also be found at Jameson Lopp’s Bitcoin
Resources (lopp.net/bitcoin.html).
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market capitalizations. Although BTC has the highest market capitalization and had
received intensive media exposure prior to our sample period, this time period allows
us to capture both the liquid trading period and the full sample of ETH and XRP in
addition to BTC.
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Figure 2: Cumulative return over time between May 1, 2017 and Jun. 30, 2019 of BTC,
XRP, ETH, GOLD and S&P 500. (github.com/QuantLet/UCC)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXLXX
Tables 1 and 2, as well as Figure 3, provide the correlations of the daily and monthly
returns from May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30, 2019 for the five assets and VIX. Red indicates a
positive correlation and blue indicates a negative correlation, with significant correlations
being marked in a darker color. The correlations are likely time varying. Figure 3 shows
the correlation time series of rolling windows of one trading year (250 days) relative to
BTC. Both XRP and ETH are positively correlated with BTC. No evidence is shown of
a significant correlation with S&P 500, GOLD or the VIX.
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Table 1: Daily Correlation, May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30, 2019.
Daily BTC ETH XRP GLD SP500 VIX
BTC 0.42 0.21 0.04 0.04 -0.06
ETH 0.42 0.20 0.06 0.01 -0.01
XRP 0.21 0.20 0.04 -0.01 -0.02
GLD 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.15 0.13
SP500 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.15 -0.80
VIX -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.13 -0.80
Table 2: Monthly Correlation, May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30 2019.
BTC ETH XRP GLD SP500 VIX
BTC 0.48 0.45 0.08 0.13 -0.08
ETH 0.48 0.58 0.26 0.12 -0.19
XRP 0.45 0.58 0.15 -0.08 0.02
GLD 0.08 0.26 0.15 -0.10 0.17
SP500 0.13 0.12 -0.08 -0.10 -0.75
VIX -0.08 -0.19 0.02 0.17 -0.75
(github.com/QuantLet/UCC)
We note, first, the cryptocurrencies are positively correlated, which is especially evid-
ent in an analysis of the monthly data. Second, the correlations of the cryptocurrencies
with both S&P 500 and GOLD are relatively low over the limited sample. We also include
the correlation with VIX, which largely hovers around zero.
Figure 4 plots the 100-day rolling window standard deviations for each asset and VIX.
Most cryptocurrencies are an extremely risky store of value given their volatility, which
is evident from the volatility of the cryptocurrencies being much higher than those of
GOLD and S&P 500.
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Figure 3: 250 days Rolling Windows Correlations of XRP, ETH, GOLD, S&P 500 and
VIX to BTC; daily data, May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30, 2019. (github.com/QuantLet/UCC)
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Figure 4: 100 days Rolling Window Standard Deviation of BTC, XRP, ETH, GOLD
and S&P 500; daily data, May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30, 2019. (github.com/QuantLet/UCC)
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Further insights into the distributional properties of cryptocurrencies can be gained
by studying the higher moments of returns, for example, excess kurtosis and skewness, as
shown in Table 3. Not surprisingly, the higher moments of the cryptocurrencies are far
from what we would expect for a normal distribution. This observation is also evident in
the QQ plots for BTC and GOLD shown in Figure 5.
Table 3: Log Daily Returns Statistics, May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30, 2019.
Mean Std. Dev. Skewness e. Kurtosis Min. Max.
BTC 0.0028 0.0454 0.0452 2.8227 -0.1892 0.2276
ETH 0.0019 0.0594 0.1501 2.0517 -0.2228 0.2602
XRP 0.0028 0.0767 1.6053 10.3886 -0.3671 0.6183
GLD 0.0002 0.0062 0.1681 1.0159 -0.0172 0.0254
SP500 0.0004 0.0086 -0.5997 5.1430 -0.0418 0.0484
(github.com/QuantLet/UCC)
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Figure 5: Standard Normal QQ plots for BTC and GOLD, May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30, 2019.
(github.com/QuantLet/UCC)
Table 4: Johansen cointegration of gold and bitcoin, May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30, 2019.
H0 Test statistic 10 % 5 %
r ≤ 1 3.11 7.52 9.24
r = 0 18.22 13.75 15.67
XXXVariable r corresponds to the number of cointegration relations.
(github.com/QuantLet/UCC)
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While cryptocurrencies have many similarities to gold (e.g., no central supply, no
official price, and they can be mined), the correlation analysis suggests very little evidence
of co-movement - at least over our limited sample. Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 4,
we find no evidence that a cointegrating relationship exists (Johansen and Juselius, 1990;
Johansen, 1991; Dwyer, 2015). Our findings are consistent with the findings of Klein et
al. (2018), see subsection 4.6.
Table 5: Onatski and Wang cointegration of gold and bitcoin, May 1, 2017 to Jun. 30,
2019.
H0 Test statistic 10 % 5 %
r ≤ 1 0.52 6.50 8.18
r = 0 8.12 12.91 14.90
XXXVariable r corresponds to the number of cointegration relations.
(github.com/QuantLet/UCC)
By testing our data with a new method suitable for high-dimensional nonstationary
time series, as researched by Onatski and Chen (2018), we can underline the previous
finding of the non-existence of a cointegrating relationship as shown in Table 5.
4 Potential Research Areas
Cryptocurrencies, as a new type of asset, offer many research opportunities for financial
econometrics. For example, research on the dynamics of cryptocurrency trading, pricing,
and volatility forecasting is advancing at a rapid pace (Briere et al., 2013; Gronwald,
2014; Cheung et al., 2015; Fry and Cheah, 2016; Chan et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2019). We
will focus on the areas of network design, sentiment, and valuation; monetary systems and
financial development; institutions; adoption, price discovery and high-frequency data;
index construction; portfolio diversification; bubbles; alternative methods to raise capital;
and the role of energy in consensus mechanisms.
4.1 Network design, sentiment, and valuation
The acceptance of this new technology has risen rapidly and activity in cryptocur-
rency trading has led to the establishment of more than 200 highly fragmented, mostly
unregulated cryptocurrency exchanges, which act more like broker-dealers than tradi-
tional exchanges (Hansen, 2018). There is considerable “off chain” trading. This might
be intrabroker trading matching or even dark pool trading which might lead to price
jumps at exchanges (Sharma, 2018). More types of cryptocurrency are being traded in
parallel, on different exchanges, with different prices (see subsections 3.1 and 3.2.). These
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parallel information sources yield dynamic high-dimensional interdependencies.
Robinson et al. (2019) introduce a “cross chain” technique which allows transactions
to be executed and their respective value to be validated across sidechains. They outline
a programming model of a swap contract for exchanging value between sidechains, and
discuss how this technology can be readily applied to many blockchain systems to provide
cross-blockchain transactions.
A major problem for blockchain applications is the respective networks’ scalability.
Bu et al. (2019) research a distributed ledger system run by targeting algorithms that
ensure a high throughput for the transactions generated in Internet-of-Things (IoT) sys-
tems. Transactions are continuously appended to an acyclic structure called tangle and
each new transaction selects as parents two existing transactions (called tips) that it
approves. This new metamorphic algorithm for tip selection by approving left behind
tips, and improving confidence within the main tangle offers the best guaranties of both
constructions called IOTA (iota.org) and its proposed improved version G-IOTA.
A number of papers study the economic incentives of current consensus methods
(Huberman et al., 2017). Biais et al. (2018) model the proof-of-work blockchain protocol
as a stochastic game and analyse the equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic miners.
They show how forks can be generated by information delays and software upgrades, and
identify negative externalities. Easley et al. (2018) investigate the role that transaction
fees play in the evolution of bitcoin from a mining-based structure to a market-based
ecology. They develop a game-theoretic model to explain the factors leading to the emer-
gence of transactions fees, as well as to explain the strategic behavior of miners and
users. They highlight the role of mining rewards and trading volume, and examine how
microstructure features such as exogenous structural constraints influence the dynamics
and stability of the bitcoin blockchain. Cong et al. (2018a) develop a theory of mining
pools that highlights risk sharing as a natural centralizing force.
Bhambhwani et al. (2019) research if cryptocurrencies have an intrinsic value related
to the networks’ computing power and network adoption. Their hypothesis is motivated
by the fact that miners expend real resources to generate the computing power required
to secure and operate the blockchain. An optimally performing blockchain serves as a
medium for transactions and attracts users, developers, and intermediaries, thereby lead-
ing to an increase in the cryptocurrency’s network size. They find, that there is a positive
and statistically significant relationship among price, computing power, and network size
(adoption levels respectively), which can be used to construct asset pricing factors.
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Ong et al. (2015) use social media data and find four key variables related to the
market capitalization of a cryptocurrency: 1) merged pull requests on GitHub, 2) num-
ber of merges, 3) number of active accounts, and 4) number of total comments. The
biggest cryptocurrencies by market capitalization experience the most activity, which is
to be expected. However, the collection of this information is unique to cryptocurrencies.
In the equity market, for example, similar information can be gleaned from third-party
sources, like analyst reports and recommendations, and perhaps news flow and confer-
ence calls. The different sources of information available for cryptocurrencies presents
new opportunities.
Research on trading patterns, herding effects, and economic decision making has star-
ted on sentiment construction/projection and cryptocurrency-specific lexica. Natural
language processing techniques in combination with other machine learning techniques
allow researchers to build sentiment measures. Cretarola and Figa-Talamanca (2017) pro-
pose a confidence-based model for asset and derivative prices in the bitcoin market with
prices influenced by measures linked to the confidence in the underlying technology. Aste
(2018) studies the dependency and causal structure of the current cryptocurrency market
and investigates the collective movements of both prices and social sentiment related to
almost 2,000 cryptocurrencies traded during the first six months of 2018. His results
uncover a complex structure of interrelations, in which prices and sentiment influence
each other across different currencies both instantaneously and with lead–lag relations.
Nasekin and Chen (2019) study investor sentiment on cryptocurrencies using a
cryptocurrency-specific lexicon proposed in Chen et al. (2018b) and statistical learning
methods. Accounting for context-specific information and word similarity by learning
word embeddings, they apply natural language processing methods for sentence-level
classification and sentiment index construction. They argue that the constructed sen-
timent indices are value-relevant in terms of its return and volatility predictability for
cryptocurrency market indices, see subsection 4.5. Pagnotta and Buraschi (2018) also ad-
dress the valuation of cryptocurrencies, and characterize the demand for bitcoins by the
available hashrate and show that the equilibrium price is obtained by solving a fixed-point
problem. They find, that “price/hashrate-spirals” amplify the demand and supply shocks.
Schilling and Uhlig (2018) analyze the coexistence and the competition between the
USD and bitcoin. They analyze bitcoin price evolution and interaction between the
bitcoin price and monetary policy which targets the USD, and obtain a fundamental
pricing equation, which in its simplest form implies that bitcoin prices form a martingale.
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4.2 Monetary systems and financial development
Blockchain-based monetary systems hold the potential to impact the macroeconomy, as
the new payment systems challenge the traditional roles that banks have always played.
Cryptocurrencies may be viable competition for fiat currencies during periods when a
central bank is perceived as weak or untrustworthy. However, the technology behind
cryptocurrencies has the potential to improve a central banks’ operations and can serve
as a platform to launch their own cryptocurrencies (Raskin and Yermack, 2016). The
petromondea (petro) issued by the government of Venezuela is an early example of these
so-called central bank digital currencies (CBDC) (Keister and Sanches, 2018).
On June 18, 2019 Facebook announced to release a cryptocurrency on it’s own in 2020
coined “Libra”. Central authorities were fast to criticize this step and governments, in-
cluding the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, expressed
their resentment and scepticism. However, the propagation of systemic banking crises
fostered by too-big-to-fail financial institutions’ neverending propensity to take greater
risks was a compelling reason behind the birth of cryptocurrencies over a decade ago and
the design of Libra with its governance network of 28 high-profile firms already being
in the project, looks similar to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
comprising the twelve Federal Reserve Banks in the United States - with the difference
of being in the hand of private actors and not a governement (Taskinsoy, 2019).
Almosova (2018) studies the economics of blockchain currency systems and the respec-
tive value competition by applying a matching function of money demand to the opera-
tion of a blockchain to observe a monetary equilibrium. With cryptocurrencies already
substituting for fiat money, Hendry and Zhu (2017) model the co-existence of different
types of transactions and show that monetary authorities’ coordination capabilities are
being restricted by the use of nonregulated cryptocurrencies.
The Catalini et. al (2019) paper on a market design for a blockchain-based financial
system provides an extended abstract on a theory of long-run equilibrium in blockchain-
based financial systems. Their theory elucidates the key market design features that sep-
arate proof-of-work and proof-of-stake approaches in the long run and when each design
might each be appropriate (see subsection 2.4) and conclude, that with weak relational
contracts or substantial concerns about outside interference, proof-of-work designs may
be preferable. With regions that have local institutions that are reliable enough to make
delegation feasible, proof-of-stake designs can lead to efficiency gains and improvements
in governanc.
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Cryptocurrencies may also increase financial inclusion and fuel economic activity in
emerging markets, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where only 34% of adults had a bank
account in 2014 (Blockchain Africa Conference 2018, blockchainafrica.co; GlobalFindex,
2017; World Bank, 2017). The possibility of using this technology for inclusion of the
unbanked could allow billions to join the modern world of internet commerce and spur
the creation of new businesses.
4.3 Institutions
There are hundred of cryptocurrency exchanges around the world. Some of the best-
known are: Binance, Bitfinex (bitfinex.com), Kraken (kraken.com), Bitstamp (bitstamp.net),
Coinbase (coinbase.com), Bitflyer (bitflyer.com), Gemini (gemini24.zendesk.com), itBit
(itbit.com), Bittrex (international.bittrex.com) and Poloniex (poloniex.com). Each of
these exchanges has its own specific traits. Kraken claims to be the largest bitcoin ex-
change in EUR volume and liquidity as well as being a partner in the first cryptocurrency
bank, collaborating with the German BaFin (bafin.de) -regulated bank Fidor. Shapeshift,
in contrast, is an exchange that allows trades without signing up for an account. Gemini,
being a fully US-regulated and licensed bitcoin and ethereum exchange, met its capital
requirements by placing all USD deposits at a FDIC-insured bank.
Coinmarketcap (coinmarketcap.com/exchanges/volume/24-hour/) lists 218 exchanges,
but even the measurement of trading volume is controversial. A recent filing to the SEC
(2019) argues that 95% of the trading volume in bitcoin is fake. The research identifies
10 exchanges with actual volume (out of 81), Binance, Bitfinex, Kraken, Bitstamp, Coin-
base, Bitflyer, Gemini, itBit, Bittrex and Poloniex.
Due to the large number of exchanges with an ever increasing number of crypto-
currencies, price discrepancies due to market inefficiencies inherently exist. The low level
of regulation and sentiment driven prices make pricing discrepancies larger than in other
financial markets, such as fiat currency exchanges and stock exchanges. However, when
one goes outside the ten exchanges with credible volume, some of the price discrepancies
may not be real. Bistarelli et al. (2019) show via a theoretical model and via an empir-
ical strategy, that arbitrage opportunities are possible by trading on different exchanges
(Cretarola et al., 2017). Their approach is complementary to other theoretical studies
on bitcoin arbitrage such as Barker (2017) or Pieters and Vivanco (2015), where the re-
searchers study triangular arbitrage with bitcoin, i.e., buying bitcoin in USD and selling
them in RMB.
Makarov and Schoar (2018) observe large recurrent arbitrage opportunities in crypto-
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currency prices relative to fiat currencies across exchanges. These opportunities often
persist for several days or weeks, and the price dispersions exist even in the face of signi-
ficant trading volumes on many of the exchanges. Makarov and Schoar find that spreads
are much smaller when cryptocurrencies are traded against each other, suggesting that
cross-border controls on fiat currencies play an important role in creating the arbitrage
opportunities. By constructing a common component and an idiosyncratic component,
they conclude that the order flow plays an important role in explaining the spreads
between exchanges. Further research in regards to arbitrage in bitcoin markets is done
by Krueckeberg and Scholz (2018).
Bistarelli et al. (2018) show that cryptocurrency arbitrage strategies are profitable
because the exchanges have different prices in the short run. Indeed, the fragmentation
of exchanges is ideal for high-frequency trading bots. Bloomberg (2017) reports that
Chinese high-frequency traders have used algorithms to identify mispricings and arbit-
rage opportunities across numerous exchanges in China. However, later in 2017, China
banned all cryptocurrency exchanges.
Hautsch et al. (2018) note that consensus protocols confront traders with random
waiting times until the transfer of ownership is accomplished. This settlement process
exposes arbitrageurs to price risk and imposes limits to arbitrage. They derive theoretical
arbitrage boundaries under general assumptions and show, by using high-frequency bit-
coin data, that these increase with expected latency, latency uncertainty, spot volatility,
and risk aversion. They conclude, that settlement through decentralized systems induces
non-trivial frictions affecting market efficiency and price formation.
4.4 Adoption, price discovery and high-frequency data
Cong et al. (2018b) provide the first fundamentals-based dynamic pricing model of
cryptocurrencies and platform tokens, taking into consideration the user-base extern-
ality and endogenous user adoption. Because the expectation of token price appreciation
induces more agents to join the platform, tokens capitalize future user adoption, generally
enhancing welfare and reducing user-base volatility (Sockin and Xiong, 2018). Catalini
and Gans (2019) show that entrepreneurs have an incentive to use subsequent product
pricing choices to ensure that crypto tokens issued to fund start-up costs — a subject we
discuss in subsection 4.8 — retain their value even when they do not confer the typical
rights associated with equity.
Athey et al. (2016) develop a theoretical framework for bitcoin adoption and bitcoin
pricing. Their paper relates to a variety of broad themes in the study of information tech-
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nology adoption and usage. They conclude, that bitcoin presents a unique opportunity to
observe both the adoption and micro-level user-to-user transaction and interaction data
in the context of a new information technology product, and in an environment where
the usage data is publicly available.
Ghysels and Nguyen (2018) examine price discovery and liquidity provision in the
secondary market for bitcoin and find that order informativeness generally increases with
order aggressiveness, but that this pattern reverses in the outer layers of the book. Ag-
gressive orders are more attractive to informed agents in a volatile market as reflected
by the increased information content of such orders. They also find that market liquidity
appears to migrate outward in response to the information asymmetry.
Griffin and Shams (2018) investigate whether tether — see subsection 2.5 — influences
bitcoin and other cryptocurrency prices, and whether the growth of a pegged crypto-
currency is primarily driven by investor demand, or is supplied to investors as a scheme
to profit from pushing cryptocurrency prices up. Their findings provide support for the
view that price manipulation may be behind substantial distortive effects in cryptocur-
rencies.
Wildi and Bundi (2018), analyze momentum trading strategies, and claim that bit-
coin markets have become much more efficient markets. The impact of high-frequency
trading combined with 24/7 trading opportunities has yet to be researched. It remains
to be seen if an increase in liquidity will reduce the heretofore observed harsh swings in
cryptocurrency prices.
The launch of bitcoin futures on both the CME as well as the CBOE (XBT) provides
opportunities to study price discovery (Karkkainen, 2018). Bitcoin futures trading gives
many institutional investors the ability to invest in bitcoin and also allows to settle con-
tracts in fiat money, potentially boosting liquidity. Currently the bitcoin futures volume
is approximately the same as the largest exchange, Binance. Almost all of the volume
is in the CME contract. The CBOE has announces they will no longer offer a bitcoin
futures contract.
Scaillet et al. (2018) identify high-frequency jump components in the bitcoin market
and link them to new information arrival over time. Guo et al. (2018) perform a spectral
clustering analysis of dynamic return-based network structures with coin attributions.
This latent group structure in the cryptocurrency market leads them to conclude that
comovements are influenced by the type of algorithm used. Makarov and Schoar (2018)
study price deviations across cryptocurrency exchanges and interpret the deviations as
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the result of a balance between idiosyncratic sentiments of noise traders and the efforts
of arbitrageurs to equilibrate prices across exchanges.
4.5 Index construction
Index construction poses unique challenges when it comes to cryptocurrencies. Tra-
ditional indices, such as the S&P 500 or Russell 3000, gather data from stocks that
are traded over particular time intervals in a small numbers of venues. Cryptocurren-
cies are traded 24/7 on hundreds of venues, like WorldCoinIndex (worldcoinindex.com),
CoinMarketCap, CryptoCompare, CryptoCurrencyIndex30 (cci30.com), or the CME CF
Cryptocurrency Indices (cmegroup.com/trading/cryptocurrency-indices.html). Prelimin-
ary research on index construction is made, for example, by Trimborn and Ha¨rdle (2018),
Chen et al. (2018a) and Kim et al. (2019).
While there are many exchanges, liquidity widely varies. Hence, the first challenge is
what price should be used for individual cryptocurrencies. Even the original two bitcoin
futures contracts (CME and CBOE) use different data sources for the price of bitcoin.
Indeed, bitcoin is the most liquid cryptocurrency and there is no agreement on the “spot”
price. The difficulty in establishing a price and the possibility of price manipulation on
certain exchanges has lead the SEC to block the creation of cryptocurrency ETFs.
Kim et al. (2019) have set the goal of capturing the expectations on the cryptocur-
rency market (represented by CRIX) through the construction of an implied volatility
proxy in absence of the derivatives for the majority of cryptocurrencies. The “fear index”
VIX of the United States stock market was selected as a guidance. Analysis of the rela-
tionships between VIX and volatility of the underlying assets provide an insight for the
selection of a respective proxy. The established VCRIX index provides a daily forecast
for the mean annualized volatility of the next 30 days.
There are other issues that provide a challenge in index construction such as forking.
When are forked cryptocurrencies added to the index? If the index focuses on large
capitalized cryptocurrencies, should a smaller capitalized fork be included? Forks are a
new concept that poses a challenge to financial engineering. The forking problem is also
a challenge for the single currency futures contracts.
4.6 Portfolio diversification
For millenia, gold has been an accepted store and measure of value, offering very long-
term stability and security in the financial marketplace (Erb and Harvey, 2013). Bitcoin
and gold are similar from both a psychological perspective and, especially, as a resource.
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Neither can be created arbitrarily: each must be mined and each has a finite supply (at
least on planet Earth). That said, gold has fundamental value when used for jewelry and
art as well as electronic or medical components. The limited supply of “digital gold”,
combined with the market’s current acceptance of it, suggests that bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies may be able to serve a similar role as gold. Klein et al. (2018) show
that the volatility dynamics of cryptocurrencies do share some similarities with those of
gold and silver.
Gkillas and Longin (2018) argue that bitcoin is the new digital gold and they invest-
igate the potential benefits of bitcoin during extremely volatile market periods. They
find that the correlation of extreme returns between bitcoin and US and European equity
markets increases during stock market drawdowns and decreases during stock market
booms. Their conclusion is that bitcoin can play an important role in asset management
and provide similar results as those of gold. Furthermore, Gkillas and Longin find a
low extreme correlation between bitcoin and gold, implying that the assets can be used
together in turbulent times. That said, we suggest caution in interpreting these results
given the very limited data.
Petukhina et al. (2018) find that due to the volatility structure of cryptocurrencies,
the application of traditional risk-based portfolios — such as equal-risk contribution,
minimum-variance and minimum-CVaR portfolios — does not boost the performance of
investments significantly. Liu et al. (2019a) examine common risk factors in crypto-
currencies, and capture the cross-sectional expected cryptocurrency returns. By con-
sidering a comprehensive list of price- and market-related factors in the stock market,
they construct cryptocurrency counterparts. Their cryptocurrency factors claim to be
successful long-short strategies that generate sizable and statistically significant excess
returns. The paper thus establishes a set of stylized facts on the cross-section of crypto-
currencies that can be used to assess and develop theoretical models.
4.7 Bubbles
Chaim and Laurini (2019) analyze daily returns of bitcoin between January 2015 and
March 2018 to empirically investigate the price bubble hypothesis. Bitcoin returns have
characteristics one would expect of a bubble: it is very volatile, exhibits large kurtosis,
and negative skewness (Camerer, 1989). By following previous research, they conclude
that bitcoin-USD prices being a bubble is plausible, but the evidence is inconclusive.
In contrast, Henry and Irrera (2017) argue that cryptocurrencies exhibit bubble-like
behavior. Recent research by Hafner (2018), contained in this special issue, extends tra-
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ditional bubble tests to the case of time-varying volatility. Dong et al. (2018) investigate
the positive and negative outcomes of a cryptocurrency model as risky and costly bubbles
in an infinite-horizon production economy with incomplete markets that has the following
framework for bitcoin: 1) enormous volatility, 2) price dynamics are significantly sensitive
to both investor sentiment and policy stances, and 3) the market exhibits diverse cyc-
lical features for US and China. Their quantitative results, however, rely heavily on the
severity of the market distortion, i.e. the intervention in the given market by a governing
body, which, in turn, determines the size of the bitcoin bubbles.
Shu and Zhu (2019) employ the log-periodic power law singularity (LPPLS) confid-
ence indicator as a diagnostic tool for identifying bubbles using the daily data on bitcoin
price. The LPPLS confidence indicator fails to provide effective warnings for detect-
ing the bubbles when the bitcoin price suffers from a large fluctuation in a short time,
especially for positive bubbles. In order to diagnose the existence of bubbles and accur-
ately predict the bubble crashes in the cryptocurrency market, their research proposes an
adaptive multilevel time series detection methodology based on the LPPLS model and
high frequency data, which effectively detects bubbles and accurately forecasts bubble
burts. On a day to week scale, the LPPLS confidence indicator has a stable performance
in terms of effectively monitoring the bubble status on a longer time scale - on a week
to month scale. Their adaptive multilevel time series detection methodology claims to
provide real-time detection of bubbles and advanced forecast of crashes to warn of the
imminent risk.
4.8 Alternative methods to raise capital
The year 2017 brought a surge in initial coin offerings (ICOs), similar to initial public
offerings (SEC-approved stock offerings). ICO’s are a potentially new financing channel
for entrepreneurs (Cong and He, 2017). The space has also generated a lot of attention
because some investors are buying into ICOs without fully understanding the technology
as well as some companies are offering an ICO without an economically meaningful use
case for the cryptocurrency (Ernst & Young, 2017; Amsden and Schweitzer, 2018).
Indeed, cryptocurrencies hold the potential to significantly reduce cost, complexity,
and simultaneously increase the speed of trading and settlement processes in a secure
manner. Cryptocurrencies are tokens, but other assets such as shares of a company can
similarly be tokenized and traded.
In summary, 329 ICOs out of 2027 ICOs listed on tokendata.io have failed (16.23%).
Extensive research is maintained regarding ICOs (Santo et al., 2016; Bajpai, 2017; SEC,
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2017a, 2017b; Adhami et al., 2018; Momtaz, 2018; Kostovetsky, 2018; Guegan and Henot,
2018; Howell et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2019b). In the sample used by Bourveau et al. (2018)
approximately 85% of ICOs are successful.
Basic alternatives to traditional banking services that have a cryptocurrency back-
bone are being researched as well. Panwar et al. (2019) research a blockchain-based
credit network where credit transfer between a sender-receiver pair happens on demand.
Distributed credit networks (DCNs) are distributed systems of trust between users, where
a user extends financial credit, or guarantees assets to other users whom it deems credit
worthy, with the extended credit proportionate to the amount of trust that exists between
the users — essentially peer-to-peer lending networks, where users extend credit, borrow
money and commodities from each other directly, while minimizing the role of banks,
clearing-houses, or bourses. They present preliminary experiments and scalability ana-
lyses based on their proposed DCN framework.
4.9 The role of energy in consensus mechanisms
As we have detailed, there are many different consensus mechanisms. Bitcoin uses a par-
ticularly energy-intensive method, which raises environmental concerns, especially with
the prevalence of bitcoin mining dependent on coal-fired power plants in China (Hileman
and Rauchs, 2017). Cong et al. (2018a) show that mining pools, as a financial innovation,
significantly exacerbate energy consumption for proof-of-work-based blockchains in their
research output regarding decentralized mining in centralized pools. As of April 2018,
aggregate energy devoted to bitcoin mining alone exceeded 60 TWh, roughly the annual
energy consumed by Switzerland as a country (Lee, 2018). Mishra et al. (2018) investig-
ate how the mining protocol of bitcoin impacts the computing capacity needs of miners
and demonstrate, that the mining algorithm as well as the transaction volume increase
computing resource needs, which in turn raises the energy consumption. Eventually they
argue resource requirements both from a computing hardware and energy consumption
needs that the future growth of the bitcoin network and the use of bitcoin as a currency
could be questionable.
As the annual electricity consumption for cryptocurrency mining is growing yearly.
Total carbon production from mining now likely exceeds that generated by the entire
nation of Portugal. Corbet et al. (2019) investigate how Bitcoin’s price volatility and the
underlying dynamics of cryptocurrency’s mining characteristics affect the energy markets,
utilities companies, and green ETFs. The results claim that continued cryptocurrency
energy-usage impacts the performance of energy sector, which emphasises the import-
ance of further assessment of environmental impacts of cryptocurrency growth. Block-
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chain technology offers a number of innovative environment-related research opportunities
(Hayes, 2017; Pop et al., 2018).
5 Closing Remarks
Cryptocurrencies are an intriguing financial innovation and offer many possible research
avenues. As with many new technologies, considerable confusion exists about both the
underlying concept of cryptocurrencies and the approaches for valuing them.
Our first goal in this paper is to provide a high level understanding of the blockchain
technology behind the cryptocurrencies. Second, we want to emphasize that there are
many different classes of cryptocurrencies — too often cryptocurrency is summarized as
bitcoin. Cryptocurrencies vary, however, and can be tokens representing shares of tra-
ditional assets, provide direct utility such as computational power, and even represent a
fiat currency.
Finally, we would like to emphasize the large number of research avenues available in
the cryptocurrency space. In 2018, we witnessed the bursting of a bubble in the most
liquid cryptocurrencies, but the research opportunities go well beyond bubbles. There is
much to do in this new field of finance and economics.
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